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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DAVIS COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION FOR THE USE
AND BENEFIT OF ANDERSON
LUMBER COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-

J.

LOYD UNDERWOOD,

Case No. 9113

Defendent,

and PHOENIX INSURANCE
COMPANY OF HARTFORD
CONNECTICUT, a Connecticut
corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Anderson Lumber Company, hereinafter referred
to as CtAnderson," plaintiff below, does not adopt the Statement of Facts set forth in the Brief of Phoenix Insurance
Company of Hartford, hereinafter referred to as CtPhoenix,"
one of the defendants below.
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The issues before the trial court in this case were issues
of fact exclusively and were submitted to the jury in the
form of special interrogatories. The jury answered each
special interrogatory in favor of this respondent and the
answer to each special interrogatory was adopted by
the lower court. The record supports these answers and the
Findings of Fact made by the lower court and its judgment
should therefore be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
J. Lloyd Underwood, hereinafter referred to as ((Underwood," after having been engaged in the construction business for some seven years, was awarded the contract to
construct an addition to the South Davis Junior High School.
(T. 49) Pursuant to statute, he obtained from Phoenix
and paid the premium on an (tOwner's Protective Bond,"
which provided in substance that materialmen and laborers
could collect unpaid accounts from Phoenix for labor performed on and materials supplied to the construction of the
high school. (Ex. A)
Underwood awarded Anderson the contract for the
mill work which would be incorporated into the high school.
(T. 10)
Work was commenced by Underwood in October, 1955,
and continued thereafter to September, 1957. (T. 52, 25)
Between the date construction commenced and May 10,
1956, Underwood obtained materials from Anderson Lumber Company which were used in the high school construction activity and the invoice price of these materials was
charged to an account with Underwood. (T. 75)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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During this same period of time, Underwood was engaged in two other construction projects. (T. 75) Each of
the two other jobs was also covered by a bond but it is not
clear from the record whether both bonds were written by
Phoenix. (T. 76) It does appear, however, to the best
recollection of Underwood, that Phoenix had written the
bonds on the other two jobs. (T. 76) In any event, charges
for materials obtained from Anderson by Underwood for use
in these other two jobs were placed in the same account with
the purchases made by Underwood for use in the high
school. (T. 75) One of the witnesses, Darrell Crawford,
Anderson's account manager, in response to defendant's counsel's question, as follows:

ceQ. Well, you had $11,000 ow1ng to you
(Anderson) on May 10?"
Answered:
((A. I would say on the Bountiful School." (T.
96)

It therefore appears that the record would support a
finding that the account due Anderson from Underwood on
May lOth was composed of purchases of materials, the total
amount of which was secured by the bond here in evidence
or by other bonds issued by Phoenix or by others.
On or about May 10, 1956, Underwood gave Anderson two checks, the total amount of which paid off the balance then due in the sum of $11,485.20 and left a small
credit balance in the account. (T. 43)
One or two days later, Underwood testified, he went
into Anderson's Ogden yard office and borrowed $7,300.
(T. 73, 74) This borrowing was evidenced by a demand
note. (T. 22, 24) The proceeds of this loan were used by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Underwood to provide working capital and to pay for labor
and material performed at and supplied to the high school
project. (T. 61) The testimony indicates that Underwood could have obtained this money from his bank, but he
believed he could obtain the money from Anderson and
made application to it. (T. 63) It is a usual business practice of Anderson to make loans to its customers engaged in
the construction business, and such loans are frequently and
customarily made by Anderson. (T. 22)
The testimony of both Underwood and George Ward,
Anderson's Ogden yard manager, establishes without contradiction that the loan application was entirely initiated by
Underwood. (T. 26, 74) Appellant's counsel has alleged in
his brief at page 6 that Underwood testified at page 62 of the
transcript that he could not have paid Anderson on May 10
if Anderson had not made the loan. The transcript does not
so recite and, in fact, indicates the exact opposite on page 62:
Mr. Hansen:
uQ. And in effect you couldn't have paid the
$11,000 on the open account if you hadn't borrowed
the $7300 back again, isn't that right?
Mr. Underwood:
uA. I could have, but it would have pinched me."
(emphasis supplied)
That is why Underwood made the loan-he was
((pinched" for funds, but he could have gotten along without
the money. It is well to remember that this transaction occurred within about six months of the date construction was
commenced and about eight months prior to the earliest time
anyone-even Underwood-knew that financial difficulties
were to later beset him.
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As a rest1lt of the payments and the loan, Anderson had
received payment in full for an account which had been and
was secured by construction bonds and had replaced the
secured account with a $7,300 loan to Underwood evidenced
by an unsecured promissory note.
After May 10, 1956, Underwood made further purchases from Anderson for materials and Anderson supplied
millwork pursuant to the subcontract. The last materials and
millwork were supplied by Anderson on December 17, 1956.
(T. 15)
A small payment was made on the account in September,
1956, but neither Underwood nor the employees of Anderson could remember contacting each other during November
or December of 1956 nor during January of 1957. (T. 12,
79)
On February 4, 1957, Underwood made out a check
to Anderson in the total sum of $10,000. On the voucher
attached to the check he wrote in his own handwriting these
words:
((Please pay note and apply balance to account." (Ex. B)
This check, with voucher attached, was then mailed by
Underwood to Anderson. (T. 77) Upon receipt of this
check, Anderson applied the total amount as directed,
$7,713.66 to the amount due for principal and interest on
the note and $2,286.34 to the amount due on the account.
(T. 45) The same day Underwood paid Anderson, he also
paid $6,000 to the A & B Plumbing Company and two weeks
prior he had paid off a note at the Commercial Security Bank.
(T. 79, 80) After making all of these payments, he still had
approximately $20,000 in his checking account. (T. 80)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On or about February 19, 1957, Phoenix apparently became concerned, and thereafter controlled all payments made
out of Underwood's checking account. (T. 80) The school
was completed to the satisfaction of the architects the following September, 19 57.
The amount due Anderson was the subject of a stipulation between the parties and was settled in open court at
$11,3 2 0 .16. (R. 21 ) The issue reserved for the trial was
whether Phoenix was entitled to an offset of the $7,713.66
as the amount applied by Anderson at the written direction
of Underwood to the payment of the note. (R. 61)
As heretofore stated, the trial court disallowed the offset and decreed that Anderson was due the entire amount
set forth in the stipulation.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE ANSWERS GIVEN BY THE JURY TO
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES WHICH WERE
ADO·PTED BY THE COURT IN ITS FINDINGS ARE
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
A. ANDERSON DID NOT KNOW NOR DID
IT HAVE REASON TO KNOW OF THE SOURCE
OF FUNDS PAID TO IT BY UNDERWOOD ON
FEBRUARY 4, 1957.
B. UNDERWOOD DIRECTED ANDERSON TO
APPLY THE CHECK OF FEBRUARY 4, 1957,
FIRST TO THE NOTE AND SECOND TO THE
ACCOUNT.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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C. THE LOAN MADE BY ANDERSON TO UNDERWOOD WAS BONA FIDE AND PLACED
ANDERSON'S ACCOUNT IN AN UNSECURED
POSITION THAT OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE
BEEN SECURED.
POINT II
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES COVERED
ALL OF THE ISSUES IN THE CASE WHICH WERE
SUPPO·RTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
POINT III
THE RECORD AND THE LAW SUPPORTS THE
PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
RELATING TO THE SECURED ACCOUNT AND
MOTIVATION.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ANSWERS GIVEN BY THE JURY TO
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES WHICH WERE
ADOPTED BY THE COURT IN ITS FINDINGS OF
FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
There appears to be no conflict between the appellant
and the respondent as to the rules of law which are applicable
to the facts of this case. This Court has heretofore announced
the law to be that where money is paid by a general contractor to a materialman who was unaware of the source
of the money, a surety cannot require that the money be
applied for materials used on the bonded job. See Utah

State Building Commission v. Great American Indemnity Co.
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et al, 105 Utah 11, 140 P. 2d 763; and Salt Lake City v.
O'Conner et al, 68 Utah 233,249 P. 810. Appellant has cited
these two cases on page 21 of his brief as the controlling
precedent.
A. ANDERSON DID NOT KNOW NOR DID IT
HAVE REASON TO KNOW OF THE SOURCE
OF FUNDS PAID TO IT BY UNDERWOOD ON
FEBRUARY 4, 1957.
Special interrogatory number 2 was directed to the
foregoing rule of law and made this inquiry:
((Do you find it proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that the moneys paid by Mr. Underwood to
the Anderson Lumber Company on or about February
4, 1957, came from the Davis County School Board
for work done on the South Davis Junior High
School, and further that the Anderson Lumber Company knew it came from that source?"
To this interrogatory the jury answered uNo." (R-60)
In support of the jury's answer, the record discloses
that during 1956 Underwood kept all of his funds derived
from borrowing, and from at least two other projects and
from the high school job in a common checking account.
There is no evidence which would indicate the source from
which the February 4, 1957, payment to Anderson was made.
Mr. Underwood was examined by appellant's counsel on at
least two different occasions during the trial and was not
even asked the source from which the funds were obtained.
The record does not contain any evidence which would indicate that any person knew where the funds used for that
payment came from.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Anderson, on the other hand, conducts a substantial
lumber and hardware business in Ogden. It was shown that
Anderson has, on the average, approximately seven hundred
outstanding accounts receivable and it would therefore be an
economic illusion to expect Anderson's employees to know
or even be charged with knowing the source from which each
customer obtained the funds to pay each account. In fact,
George Ward testified it would be an impossibility. (T. 36)

It further appears from the record that the contacts
between George Ward and Underwood occurred on infrequent occasions. From the latter part of November,
1956, to February 4, 1957, Underwood had neither seen
George Ward nor had there been correspondence between
them nor even a phone call.
In considering these established facts, it appears appropriate to cite a comment of Justice Crocket where, in affirming the lower court decision entered by Justice Wade in the
Utah State Building case, supra, he stated:
((It would be extremely impra.ctical for a materialman dealing with a contractor to be under the
necessity of inquiring into the source of the money
paid him, and equally impractical to require the materialman to apply the money to any particular job,
unless he knew the source of it."
Practical commerce would militate against any other
conclusion.
This record therefore sets forth ample evidence to support the answer of the jury and the finding of the court to
the effect that Anderson did not know the source from
which the payment of February 4, 1957, was made.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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B. UNDERWOOD DIRECTED ANDERSON TO
APPLY THE CHECK OF FEBRUARY 4, 1957,
FIRST TO THE NOTE AND SECOND TO THE
ACCOUNT.
Special Interrogatory number 3 asked the jury to answer
the following question:
uDo you find it proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that Mr. Underwood directed that the payment on or about February 4, 1957, be applied first
to note and balance to his material account, at the time
the payment was delivered?"
The jury answered this interrogatory uYes." (R-60)
The answer given and the finding made are supported
in this record by both written evidence and oral testimony.
Mr. Underwood made the payment of February 4, 1957,
to Anderson in the form of a check with voucher attached.
Written on the voucher was the direction to ccPlease pay
note and apply balance to account." Underwood testified
that this direction was placed upon the voucher by him in
the sanctuary of his own home and at his own and sole
election. The check and voucher were then mailed to
Anderson without a prior personal conversation of any nature. In the course of business, George Ward made out a
receipt and Underwood's note and general account with
Anderson was appropriately credited with the payment pursuant to the written direction on the voucher. These facts
afford ample ground for the jury to answer affirmatively
interrogatory number 3.
Although it is probably superfluous to elaborate on the
law which formed the basis for interrogatory number 3,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

considering the fact the jury found Anderson did not have
knowledge of the source of the funds used for the payment,
we are nevertheless moved to state very respectable authority holds that even though a materialman does in fact know
of the source of funds paid to it by a contractor
(( ... it could, pursuant to an understanding between the materialman and the subcontractor, apply
the money to the extinguishment of a prior unsecured
debt on the ground that the moneys so unconditionally paid to the subcontractor became its money to
use as its own, and that the surety had no equity in the
money and no right to direct the applications of
payments." See the Utah State Building Company
case, supra, citing the case of Standard Oil Company

v. Dayetal, 161 Minn. 281,201 N. W. 410,41 A.L.R.
1291. See also People v. Powers, 108 Mich. 339, 66
N. W. 215, and Cram Company v. Johnson et al, 67
F. 2d 121.
Consequently and by reason of the written direction given
it, Anderson would have been entitled to retain the full payment as against Phoenix even if it had knowledge the funds
were in fact derived from the high school job.
Here, the jury and the trial court have found that
Anderson did not have knowledge and that Anderson was
directed to apply the payment as it did. Therefore, either
finding compelled the trial court to enter its decree in
Anderson's favor and would be supportable by the record.
C. THE LOAN MADE BY ANDERSON TO UNDERWOOD WAS BONA FIDE AND PLACED
ANDERSON'S ACCOUNT IN AN UNSECURED
POSITION THAT OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE
BEEN SECURED.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Special interrogatories numbered 4 and 5 generally asked
if Anderson attempted to make it appear that a debt for
materials delivered to various jobs would be insured by the
bond and that thereafter the alleged sham loan could be
paid without an admission that payment was being applied
to projects other than the high school. The jury and the
trial court found that the loan was bona fide and that there
was no attempt made to maneuver or misapply payments.
(R. 60-61)
The record supports the answer of the Jury and the
finding of the court.
1. The Loan.

On May 10, 1956, the Anderson account with Underwood was composed of charges for materials supplied to
the high school and to two other jobs. 1 The high school job
was bonded with Phoenix under the bond here in evidence
and the other two jobs were bonded either with Phoenix or
other bonding companies. 2 Consequently, the May, 1956
account was secure insofar as Anderson was concerned. On
approximately May 10, 1956, Underwood paid the then
outstanding secured account. About two days later, he
testified, he borrowed $7300 from Anderson to be used by
him in the high school project. After the money had been
loaned to Underwood, Anderson held an unsecured promissory note and had relinquished a fully bonded and secured
open account-and an account which probably would have
been secured by the bonds of this appellant. These facts
are reasonably established by this record.
IMr. Crawford's testimony indicated the account was made up of only
charges for materials supplied to the high school.
2Underwood's best recollection was that both of the other jobs were bonded
with Phoenix.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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If a sham loan were to be made by a business man to
bring an account under a bond, would a fully secured and
bonded account be relinquished? Would such a manipulation be attempted merely to jeopardize the eventual payment of an account? What advantage could possible be
obtained by either party where the account paid off is a bonded
account? The answer to these questions must necessarily
be that businessmen do not commit fraud or conspire with
others to imperil an existing secure account in the hope that
at some future date they can restore themselves to their
original position.
The circumstances existing at the time the loan to
Underwood was made further indicate the high school construction was proceeding as planned. It wasn't until nine
or ten months after May, 1956, that the first rumblings of
financial doom were heard. The record further indicates
that the proceeds of the loan were used by Underwood to
discharge obligations to laborers engaged in the high school
construction activity and therefore the loan indirectly decreased the obligation of Phoenix.
All of the facts existing at the time of the loan militate
against concluding that a sham loan was entered into, and
support the findings of the court and jury.
2. The Payment.
The remaining question is whether the record supports
the answer of the jury and the finding of the court that
there was no manipulation of payments.

It will be remembered that $10,000 was paid by Underwood to Anderson on February 4, 1956. At the same time,
Underwood paid the plumbing contractor and a short time
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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previous had paid off a loan to an Ogden Bank. The $10,000
payment to Anderson did not even pay half of the outstanding obligation then due and there remained on the account
after application of the payment an amount slightly in excess
of $12,000. Underwood, after all of the above payments
had been made, had remaining in his bank account approximately $20,000.
Insofar as George Ward was concerned, Underwood occupied only the status of a customer and was served pursuant
to the usual business practice of Anderson. Both George Ward
and Underwood testified that neither had seen the other nor
talked to nor corresponded with the other from the latter
part of November, 1956, until after the payment of February
4, 1957, had been made.
The payment of that date was made by check, filled
out in Underwood's home with directions written thereon
in his own handwriting, which directions were decided upon
by his own independent election. The check and voucher
were deposited in the mail and duly received thereafter by
George Ward. This record is patently silent that Anderson
participated or influenced in any manner the actions and
decisions of Underwood in effecting the payment in the
foregoing manner. If deception or manipulation were contemplated through this payment by Underwood, Anderson
should not be charged therewith, and if Underwood contemplated a deception or manipulation or even attempted
to prefer Anderson over other creditors, why would he pay
less than one-half of his account when ample funds existed
to pay the entire balance? Further, Underwood was under
the impression at the time the payment was made that this
loan, the proceeds from which were used in the high school
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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project, was covered by the bond. 3
be reasonable.

That impression would

Upon these adduced facts, the answers of the jury and
the findings of the court that the loan was bona fide and that
there was no attempt to manipulate payments are reasonable
and supportable.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support
the answers given by the jury to the special interrogations.
This court has recently stated:
((However, as we have indicated many times, in
reviewing the facts in a case like this, we must do so
in a light that most strongly supports the verdict,
and we must go along with the verdict unless it
clearly is not supported by any substantial evidence."
See Dairy Distributor v. Local Union 976, 8 Utah 2d
124, 329 P. 2d 414.

POINT II
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES COVERED
ALL OF THE ISSUES IN THE CASE WHICH WERE
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Defendant Phoenix, was not entitled to have its theory
of the case presented to the jury unless the evidence would
justify reasonable men to follow its theory. See Beckstrom v.
Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210, 282 P. 2d 309. Phoenix contends
that the interrogatories submitted to the jury were so restrictive as not to cover the ((ultimate" issue of whether Anderson
and Underwood undertook to defraud Phoenix. The evi3
The issue of whether a construction loan is included within the coverage of a bond has been the subject of some litigation. See cases cited at 127
A.L.R. 974; and Tolton Investment Co. vs. Maryland' Casualty, 77 Utah 226
293 p 611.
'
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dence presented by the parties to this action centered.around
three transactions between Underwood and Anderson. The
first occurred about May 10, 1956, when Underwood paid
his account with Anderson and the second occurred approximately two days later when Underwood borrowed $7300
evidenced by his promissory note. The third occurred on
February 4, 1957, when Underwood mailed to Anderson his
check for $10,000. If any conspiracy had been attempted,
the concerted action would have to have occurred either as
an incident of the loan transaction in May, 1956, or the payment transa.ction in February, 1957, or both.
Interrogatory 4 presented to the jury the question of
Anderson's motivation in making the loan to Underwood.
Interrogatory 5 presented to the jury the question of whether
the loan was used as a device to apply monies received from
Underwood to accounts for materials used in projects other
than the high school. The evidence presented by the defendant to support his theory was, at best, entirely circumstantial.
Insofar as this record is concerned, the facts surrounding the loan and the facts surrounding the payment of February, 1957, are only consistent with bona fide acts of
businessmen engaged in regular and normal and lawful
commerce.

It would seem that Phoenix would have been shouldered
with the burden of making some affirmative showing supporting its theory of the case to have been entitled to interrogatories 4 and 5, but here there was none. Phoenix even
failed to produce evidence whereby Anderson or Underwood
would have obtained an advantage motivating a so-called
ccsham loan" or a Hmanipulation" of payments. Ultimately,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a distinct disadvantage and risk beset Anderson by reason
of the loan. It certainly should be added that if this record
would support a ((fraud" or ((conspiracy" instruction or
interrogatory, then any payment made by a contractor to a
materialman during the period bonded construction was
proceeding could be attacked and recoupment sought in a
court of law under a broad, nebulous and general instruction of ((fraud" or ((conspiracy." As heretofore stated, the
law only permits instructions to be given jurors if the record
supports the instructions requested.
Appellant's brief appears to request that in view of the
fact that the court and jury has found against it on the only
three questioned acts of the parties, it should now be allowed
a broad general instruction unrelated to the record, unrelated
to those transactions and unrelated to any other event. Such
an instruction would give the jury pure license to speculate
without relating their deliberations to the evidence.
In Finney v. Finney, 164 S. W. 2d 263 (Texas 1942) an
action was brought to recover an interest in realty conveyed
by plaintiff to defendant on the ground that the conveyances
were induced by the fraud of the defendant. The Court of
Civil Appeals of Texas stated:
((We further suggest that it is not proper to submit an issue of false and fraudulent statements and
representations in general terms."
((The proper way is to submit the substance of
the statement or representation, that is to say, ask the
jury if the particular statement or representation
were made, whether it was true or false and whether
or not it was relied upon in doing the act or thing
pleaded as induced by it wrongfully."
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In McMurdie vs. Underwood, 346 P. 2d 711 (Utah
1959) this court stated that a refusal to give requested in-

structions was not error where the basic issues were fairly
and intelligibly presented to the jury by the instructions
g1ven.
Plaintiff submits that in this case the proper way to
present appellant's theory to the jury was to associate the
theory to the loan transaction and to the payment transaction.
This the court did with interrogatories 4 and 5. In view of
the evidence adduced at the trial any other interrogatory
would have been improper and not supported by the evidence.
POINT III
THE RECORD AND THE LAW SUPPORTS THE
PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
RELATING TO THE SECURED ACCOUNT AND
MOTIVATION.
Appellant's pleaded defense to the claim of Anderson
was that of fraud and conspiracy. In order to meet this
defense, Anderson proved that its transactions with Underwood had been bona fide and in complete good faith.
The Texas Civil Appeals Court has said:
HWhenever issues of fraud and good faith are
raised, the evidence must take a rather wide range
and may embrace all the facts and circumstances
which go to make up the transaction, disclose its true
character, explain the acts of the parties and throw
light on their objects and intentions." See Blanton v.
Sherman Compress Co., 256 S. W. 2d 8 84, 20 Am Jr.
320.
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Here, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion,
permitted the parties to introduce evidence supporting their
theories of the case. Plaintiff, in attempting to prove its
good faith throughout its course of dealings with Underwo~d
and the bonding company, showed:
1. That the account due Anderson as of May 10, 1956,
consisted in part of the materials which had been
supplied to the high school job;

2. That the account due Anderson as of May 10, 1956,
consisted of materials which had been supplied to
bonded jobs;
3. That the $7300 loan was used to pay labor and
other costs incident to the high school job.

If Anderson and Underwood had conspired to defraud
the bonding company, why did Underwood pay his account
as of May 10, 1956, which consisted in part of materials
supplied to the high school project? If there was a conspiracy to defraud the bonding company, why did Anderson permit Underwood to pay an account which
consisted of materials supplied to bonded jobs and make him
a construction loan evidenced by an unsecured note? If there
was a conspiracy to defraud the bonding company, why did
Anderson make a loan to Underwood when it knew the
money was going to be used to meet the payroll on the high
school job? The evidence adduced by the plaintiff was to
show the good faith of Anderson and Underwood. The
evidence supporting plaintiff's theories was admitted by the
trial court to show what motivated Anderson in its transactions with Underwood.
Plaintiff's counsel properly argued its theories and the
evidence in support thereof to the jury. In Joseph v. W. H.
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Groves, L.D.S. Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P. 2d 330, this
court said:
((Counsel of plaintiff in argument to the jury
should be permitted to refer to and use all of the
competent evidence he has marshalled and presented
at the trial and to explain its meaning and argue its
significance to his client's cause."
The portions of counsel's argument objected to by appellant in its brief fall precisely within the foregoing rule.
I. Argument That Other Jobs Were Bonded.

We have heretofore set forth ample record citations to
demonstrate that the record would support a finding that
all of the jobs to which materials were supplied by Anderson,
and which composed the account existing May 10, 1956, were
bonded jobs and that Underwood's best recollection was
that the bonds were placed with this appellant. Further, we
have heretofore set forth ample record citations to show
that the May 10, 1956, account was composed of purchases,
in part, if not wholly, supplied to the high school jobthe precise job appellant's bond here covered. Consequently,
the record supports an argument calculated to show:
a. No ((sham loan" existed.
b. That Anderson's May 10, 1956, account with
Underwood was fully secured.
c. That if that account was not secured, then Anderson was without security for the final account.
d. That the note was unsecured and not covered by
any bond.
Respondent was required to ·argue these facts to rebut
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appellant's theories and further to demonstrate to the jury
that appellant was wrong in saying in its closing argument
that the May 10, 1956, account was unsecured (T. 145);
and that Anderson, by making the loan, thought it was
transferring an unsecured indebtedness to a secured indebtedness. (T. 148)
That portion of the argument objected to in Appellant's
brief is supported by the record and is proper rebuttal to the
argument made by counsel for Phoenix.
2. Motivation of Anderson.

Appellant has quoted a portion of the argument made
by counsel for Anderson reported on page 162 of the transcript. An objection was made by Mr. Hansen that argument was being made outside the record. No specific
reference to the evidence objected to was made. Anderson's counsel then continued argument attempting to show
that there could be no motivation on the part of Anderson
to wrongfully take funds from Phoenix through the device
of the loan, because the proceeds were used by Underwood
to pay laborers on the high school job-the very liability
Phoenix was obligated contingently under its bond to pay.
Consequently, the indirect effect of the loan to Underwood
was to afford a benefit to Phoenix through funds supplied
by Anderson. This argument on Anderson's motive was
made to refute the persistent assertions by counsel for
Phoenix that Anderson had attempted to defraud Phoenix.
The record supports this argument and counsel for Anderson would have been derelict in his obligation to his client
to have ignored such evidence.
Reference to a ((pretrial order" often made by appellant
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as the basis for excluding argument and evidence is somewhat perplexing for the reason that this record does not
contain, nor do we recall that the court ever entered, such
an order.
CONCLUSION
There appears to be no significant issue of law in this
case. Appellant has composed a brief in which it argues
circumstantial evidence. The record, refutes the conclusions
desired by appellant and contains affirmative documentary
and oral testimony amply supporting the findings arrived
at by the jury and the court.
What Phoenix appears to really desire is to have this
Court over-rule in substance, but not in form, the rules
established by the O'Conner case, supra, and the Utah State
Building case, supra, and in lieu of those cases adopt a theory
which would impress an equity in favor of the carrier on all
funds paid by Davis County School District, regardless of
the lawful purposes to which such funds are devoted. This
Court has aptly refuted such a doctrine and in the O'Conner
case, supra, it quoted the Standard Oil Co. case, supra, as
follows:
uThe creditor should not, in the collection of his
money, be burdened with the responsibility of having
to know the status of his debtor's accounts nor the
status of the obligation of the surety of the debtor.
The surety in modern business should be, and usually
is, quite able to care for itself. It selects those for
whom it becomes surety. Most contractors and subcontractors must necessarily use some of their money
that they receive in payment of obligations not incurred in the particular contract from which their
money is received. When they receive their money
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unconditionally, it is their own and they may do with
it as they please. If a creditor must stop, before he
accepts payments from his debtor, and make the
impertinent inquiry as to his standing with his surety,
the unsatisfactory results are obvious."
This case demonstrates the wisdom of such a rule and the
decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
C. PRESTON ALLEN and
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER

Attorneys for Anderson Lumber Co.
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